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Abstract 
The paper examines whether a worker’s sick absence behaviour influences the risk of 
becoming unemployed. Swedish panel data are used to estimate the relationship between 
the incidence and duration of sick leave and subsequent unemployment. The results 
indicate that an increase in the number of sick leaves as well as an increase in the duration 
of sick spells is associated with higher risk of unemployment. Women have a significantly 
higher risk then men of unemployment associated with sick leave spells longer than 28 
days. An implication of the results is that less absence-prone workers are more likely to 
remain employed in a recession. This in turn may in part explain the pro-cyclical pattern of 
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1  Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to test if sick absence is associated with an increased 
risk of future unemployment. Swedish panel data are used to estimate the effect on 
the risk of unemployment of previous sick-leave behaviour. The transition into 
unemployment is studied from January 1st 1992 to December 31st 1998 and the 
absence record is observed January 1st 1989 to February 28th 1991.  
The everyday choice for the worker, to be or not to be present at work, will be 
affected by present and future repercussions of the choice. For the majority of 
workers in some European countries, the compensation level for sickness absence 
has been close to the normal wage during the last decades (Nyman et al., 2002). A 
smaller income loss during a sick leave spell may imply a low incentive to attend 
work. However, some countries that have relatively generous compensation 
schemes have a relatively low absence rate; Germany is a case in point.1 This 
suggests that other factors also affect the everyday attendance choice.  
The sick leave utilisation may yield a productivity signalling effect; a less absent 
worker is more attractive from the employer’s perspective, especially if the 
employer pays directly parts of the costs associated with a sick spell. A worker with 
an extensive absence record may be tagged as expensive and less productive, which 
in turn may lead to dismissal (Yaniv, 1991). The penalty may exist, even though 
the individual has to use a sick spell to recover from illness to restore productivity, 
due to that the employer may have problems monitoring the health among 
employees. If one disregards the disutility of being sick, the cost for the individual 
can be divided into a direct cost of the sick leave, the possible income loss, and an 
indirect cost which can be seen as the possible effect on future labour market 
outcomes. In the analysis of the economic incentives of calling in sick, one should 
have in mind that some sort of non-economic work moral effect is likely. 
Some attention during the last decade, among economists, has been given to 
absence due to sickness. This especially in Sweden where the absence rate, in 1990, 
was one of the highest among the industrialized countries and thereafter had a 
                                                 
1 An international overview of the sickness absence rate is presented in Barmby et al. (2000).  
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rapid decline followed by an increase in the end of the 1990s. The changes in the 
Swedish sick leave insurance system during the same time period were many and 
resulted in large differences in the sick leave compensation rate over time. Palme 
and Johansson (1996) and Cassel et al. (1996) have shown that economic incentives 
seem to matter for the incidence of sick leave. They also find that the variation in 
the sick leave rate can not solely be explained by higher costs of absence; the 
findings shows on a significant inverse relationship between the unemployment 
rate and the incidence of sick absence. Johansson and Palme (1998) show that the 
unemployment rate affect the incidence of sick leave negatively and the incidence 
of recovery positively. These findings suggest a pro-cyclical pattern of the sick leave 
rate, which later also has been shown by e.g. Arai and Skogman-Thoursie, (2001), 
Askildsen et al., (2000), Askildsen et al., (2002) and Henrekson and Persson, 
(2001).  
Leigh (1985) discusses the theoretical pro-cyclical relationship between the sick 
leave rate and the unemployment rate. He claims that besides an eventual 
disciplining effect the unemployment rate has on the sick-leave rate, a labour force 
composition effect is likely if absence prone workers have a higher incidence of 
unemployment in an economic down-turn. A fear of being laid-off that reduces the 
number of annual absence days is credible, if one finds a positive relationship 
between sick leave utilisation and the risk of getting unemployed. 
The main result of the estimated models in this essay is that the both the incidence 
and the duration of a sick leave is associated with an increased risk of 
unemployment. Some evidence shows that women have a higher unemployment 
risk associated with long sick leave spells. Older male workers seem to have higher 
risk of unemployment than young male workers, given equal work experience, 
which may partially be explained by health differences over age.  
The next section discusses the relationship between sick absence and 
unemployment. Section 3 presents the data, how the sample was selected and 
defines some key variables. Section 4 discusses sample issues, describes the 
estimation method and the model to be estimated. Section 5 presents the results 
and finally section 6 concludes.  
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2  Theoretical issues 
The everyday decision for the worker, if she is going to attend work or not, cannot 
exclusively be seen as a choice between earning the normal wage rate or being 
compensated through the sickness benefit system. Health status is deemed to be 
important when valuing the two choices; a cold will raise the effort needed to 
remain as productive as in a healthier state. According to efficiency wage models2, 
the non-work opportunity will be more attractive for the worker if the required 
effort level is higher. The labour market outcome, such as the subsequent risk of 
unemployment, may also be an important factor in the valuation of an absence 
spell. 
Health is one kind of human capital that is a little bit different than education 
since workers often start with a large health endowment that must be continuously 
replenished (Currie and Madrian, 1999). A sick leave can therefore be seen as an 
investment in health, which can prevent future sick leaves (Gilleskie, 1998). 
Therefore it may be necessary and valuable for the individual to call in sick once in 
a while to keep up productivity. The stochastic behaviour of illnesses and accidents 
over time affects the transition rate from work to sick absence, i.e. the incidence 
intensity. Return from a sick leave, the intensity of cure, can also be seen as a 
stochastic process, where individual recovery is a result of both personal 
characteristics and the level of illness. The flows into and out of sick leave are also 
likely to be affected by the economic incentives the individual faces to attend work. 
Previous literature has various explanations of factors other than health that may 
affect attendance behaviour. The worker can be using sick leave, compensated by 
the employer or the public sick-pay system, as a way to compensate for bad job 
conditions or low wages. This can be seen as on the job shirking as described by 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Barmby et al. (1994) has formulated a theoretical 
relationship between wages, absence and shirking. The probability of being tagged 
as a less productive worker or a shirker, due to sick absence, is likely to be 
positively correlated to the number of days absent. Yaniv (1991) points out that the 
worker is taking a risk by calling in sick, this due to the fact that misuse of sick 
                                                 
2 For an overview see Layard et al. (1991).  
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leaves may lead to dismissal and involuntary unemployment. There is also 
evidence that the sick leave incidence is partially non-health related, e.g. Skogman 
Thoursie (2002) has evidence of an increased sick leave rate among Swedish men 
during the Calgary winter Olympics in 1988. The previous absence behaviour of 
the worker can be seen as a signal for the employer or future employers of the 
workers’ health status and/or shirking tendency. 
Leigh (1985) has studied the relationship between unemployment and absenteeism 
and argues that workers are more absence prone in times of low unemployment. A 
pro-cyclical absence rate can come from a fear of unemployment during a period of 
high unemployment, but may also be induced by the composition of the labour 
force. If workers with low absence rates are retained during economic recessions 
and more absence prone workers are laid-off, a pro-cyclical pattern of the aggregate 
absence rate will emerge.  
Le Grand (2000) and Arai and Vilhelmsson (2001) have estimated the risk of 
unemployment in Sweden during the economic downturn in the 1990s. They find 
that several individual and employer characteristics explain parts of the 
unemployment risk, such as gender, age, income, education, number of children, 
marital status, country of origin, experience, sector and public/private employer. 
There is also evidence that information about the local labour market, such as local 
unemployment rate, affects the unemployment risk.   
The discussion suggests that the intensity of job separation may be seen as a 
function of exogenous macro economic variables () Y , exogenous individual 
characteristics () X  and the flow into  () s  and out of () c  sick leave: 
  () ,, , XYsc λλ =  (1) 
In Sweden an unemployed person can also be on sick leave and benefit from the 
government provided sick leave compensation; in this case the flows between 
unemployment and sickness insurance may be affected if there exists an economic 
incentive other than a gain in leisure time. The flows between unemployment and 
sickness insurance are not accounted for in this study. For an analysis of incentives 
of using sick leaves during an unemployment spell see Larsson (2002).  
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3  Data 
3.1  Data description and sampling procedure 
The individual data used in the empirical analysis is obtained from LINDA3, which 
is a registry based data set of 3.35 percent of the Swedish population (about 
300,000 individuals in the 1990’s). To be able to observe the pattern of sick leave 
behaviour, the database was expanded with sick leave spell data for the period 
1989-1991 from the sickness period register obtained from the National Social 
Insurance Board. Information about the transition into unemployment is obtained 
from the HÄNDEL4 database. Demographic variables, collected from other sources 
and included in LINDA, are also used. The local job destruction rate, measured at 
municipality level, is used in the analysis to capture local differences in the job 
destruction.  
The sickness period register contains information of all sick spells covered by the 
sickness insurance; the database does not consist of any additional health 
information as medical diagnosis or overall health status. For each individual, the 
number of sick leave spells per year and the mean sick leave spell duration will be 
used as measures of the pattern of individual sick leave behaviour. These measures 
are divided into three different spell length groups, namely short sick leave spells 
(less than 8 days), medium sick leave spells (8 to 28 days) and long sick leave spells 
(longer than 28 days). Short sick leave spells can be seen as “unverified” sickness 
since only sick leaves of 8 days or longer require a physician certificate. Long sick 
leave spells are likely to be recertified due to that the physician certificate often is 
time limited. The mean sick leave spell duration will be measured as the mean 
number of extra days in the sick leave spells and is obtained by decreasing the 
mean sick absence spell duration with 1, 8 and 29 for the short, medium and long 
spell durations, respectively. This, if the individual had at least one observed sick 
leave. E.g. the number of extra days will be 0 if no sick leave spell is observed, in a 
short sick spell of 1 day will the number of extra days be 0 and for a 2 day spell will 
the number of extra days be 1. The initial effect of the first day of a sick spell will 
be captured by the number of sick spells. This to avoid some of the collinearity 
                                                 
3 Longitudinal INdividual DAtabase, for an overview see Edin and Fredriksson (2000). 
4 Included in LINDA and are job search data from the Swedish National Labour Market Administration.  
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between the number of spells and the mean spell duration, where the mean extra 
days in a sick spell solely will capture the mean effect of an extra day of sick leave. 
In the analysis, both full-time and part-time sick leaves will be counted as a sick 
leave spell. 
The pattern of sick leave behaviour is measured during the period January 1989 to 
February 1991. During this period, the government provided sick leave 
replacement rate was constant at 90 percent of the wage up to a given ceiling.5 One 
other reason to select this period is that there exists no register data of sick leave 
spell durations shorter than 15 days from 1992 onwards, due to the introduction of 
a 14 employer-paid day sick pay period in January 1992.6  
The studied population is individuals 25 to 54 years of age, defined as fulltime 
employed during the entire period 1989 to 1991, enabling comparability with the 
sick leave measure. Individuals that receive their main income from self-
employment are excluded from the sample because they are likely to have different 
incentives and possibilities to use (or not use) sick leave compensated by the 
National Social Security Board. The age restriction is imposed as young individuals 
may be in education and workers over 54 are more likely to retire during the period 
of study. Because the LINDA database contains no information about employment 
status, the individual will be regarded to be employed during a calendar year if all 
following criteria are satisfied: income above a given threshold, has not received 
any unemployment benefits, has not received any government provided study 
grants, has not received any income due to military service and not received any 
pension. The income threshold is set to the lowest quartile of the earning 
distribution for full time employed janitors within the public sector (follows the set-
up in Edin et al., 2000). In 1990, this threshold is set to 118,000 SEK and the other 
years’ thresholds are calculated by multiplying the threshold for 1990 with the 
earning development for public employed personnel7. The earnings consist of 
labour income and income from employment insurances as sick benefits and 
parental leave benefits.  
                                                 
5 Some employers covered the non-benefited 10 percent of the wage during a sick spell and some employers also 
added up over the ceiling in the sickness insurance system during this time period. 
6 Sick pay is the salary paid by the employer during the first days of a sick leave and the information about sick 
spells within the sick pay period is not fully reported to the National Social Insurance Board during the 90’s. 
7 The earnings development data were obtained from Statistics Sweden (SCB).  
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The individuals are followed from January 1st 1992 until the first unemployment 
event or censoring. Registering as unemployed at the local employment office is 
considered as an event and censoring occurs when the study period ends on the last 
of December 1998 or if the employment criteria above do not bind. If the 
employment criterion does not bind one year, the censoring date is set to December 
31st of the preceding year. This means that if one observation is considered as 
censored in 1992, it is removed from the data set and does not add any information 
to the analysis.  
T h e  l e n g t h  o f  a n  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  e m p l o y m e n t  r e c o r d  i s  l i k e l y  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  r i s k  o f  
unemployment due to the value of experience or because of labour market 
regulations in Sweden. In Sweden it is regulated by law that the “Last in, first out” 
principle8 should be followed when workplaces are downsizing, suggesting that 
tenure might be an important factor in predicting the risk of unemployment. The 
length of the last continuous full time employment spell is used as a proxy for 
tenure and is defined as how many consecutive years before 1989 the individual 
had an income above the threshold and did not received unemployment benefits. 
Retrospective labour incomes and unemployment benefit pay-outs are studied 
using annual data from 1978 and individuals with unbroken employment 
throughout all studied years are considered having at least 14 years of unbroken 
experience. This yields 12 distinct experience groups. New entrances in the LINDA 
database (to replace deceased persons or emigrants) are treated as if they did not 
have any income when not observed. It is likely that the new entrances in the 
database do not deviate from the sick leave behaviour distribution and the 
unemployment risk distribution of individuals that have been followed throughout 
the entire period of study. Together with the small proportion these observations 
represent, it is unlikely that this will affect the estimates of interest.  
To control for previous work absence the fraction of benefits received relative to 
total employment income is collected from the National Social Security Board for 
the period 1986 to 1988. The benefits paid out by the National Social Security 
Board can include: sick leave compensation, parental leave benefits, care of sick 
child compensation and compensation to look after a disabled person. 
                                                 
8 Regulated by law and stipulates that the last worker employed will be the first one to be laid off if the workplace 













Figure 1. Visualisation of the sampling procedure, where dots represent an event. 
Compensation during labour market training and military training is also included 
in the benefit measure, but would not affect the calculated measure as workers are 
defined as non-employed if they eligible for these compensations.  
The job destruction rate is used to catch the local negative shocks to employment 
and is defined as the sum of all negative employment changes at plants within a 
municipality divided by the average employment at the plants in time t  and  1 t − . 
For an extensive description of this measure and the underlying data, see 
Johansson (2002). 
To summarise the sampling procedure (illustrated in figure 1); an individual has to 
be full time employed during 1989 to 1991 and not in unemployment, education, 
military service or receiving a pension to be eligible in the sample. Individuals are 
followed from January 1st 1992 to December 31st 1998 where the transition from 
full time employment to unemployment is observed. To capture plausible 
differences in risk of unemployment, due to experience, the retrospective unbroken 
employment spells will be considered in the analysis. 
 
3.2  Descriptive statistics 
Mean values for the included variables are presented in table A1 in the appendix 
for all observations, for those who had an unemployment spell during the observed  
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period and for the ones that did not register as unemployed during the observed 
period. The pattern of sick leave utilisation is clearly different among the workers 
who experience a period of unemployment between 1992 and 1998 compared with 
workers who were not unemployed during the same period. Workers who got 
unemployed had on average 2.3 short sick leave spells, compared to 1.8 for those 
employed continuously. This pattern persists over the other sick leave spell 
duration measures.  
The sick benefit ratio of total labour income shows the same pattern as the sick 
leave measures. Workers who experienced at least one unemployment period 
between 1992 and 1998 had on average a 4.0 percent income fraction from sick 
benefits during the period 1986 to 1988, whereas workers who remained employed 
during the entire period had on average a previous sick benefit ratio of 3.0 percent.  
Women are a smaller proportion of those experiencing unemployment, 25.0 percent 
against 34.6 percent among those with continuous employment record.  The young 
are more heavily represented among the ones who experienced at least one 
unemployment spell. Income in 1992 is lower in the group that became unemployed 
(190,200 SEK against 213,200 SEK) and the workers that did not experience an 
unemployment period were more likely to be married, living together or have 
children under 16 years of age. Immigrants are somewhat overrepresented among 
those reported unemployed and workers with less education are more likely to face 
a period of unemployment. Working in the public sector also seems to be associated 
with a lower probability of becoming unemployed. A higher fraction of workers in 
the construction sector and a lower fraction of workers in the service sector became 
unemployed during the 1992 to 1998. 
The number of workers in the sample is 51,136 and 7,079 of them experienced at 
least one event during 1992 to 1998. In table 1, the numbers of workers are 
presented for the different experience length groups, where a right censored 
observation is equivalent to a non-event. The percentage of right censored workers 
increases as experience increases, which indicates a decreased risk of 
unemployment as the number of years employed full-time increases. Almost 23 
percent of the workers with three years of experience faces at least one period of  
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unemployment during 1992 to 1998 and for workers who had at least 14 years of 
experience the same figure is 9 percent.  
As discussed above it is likely that workers with less seniority have a higher 
probability of experiencing a period of unemployment than workers with longer 
experience. As shown in figure 2, the risk of becoming unemployed is declining 
with experience, both between experience groups and over time. The 
unemployment hazard will also vary over time as the economy is affected by 
business-cycle fluctuations.  
The unemployment rate in Sweden was low and relatively constant during the 
sample qualification period 1989 to 1991, covering a period of relative economic 
prosperity. Thereafter, as can be seen in figure 3, the unemployment rate increased 
rapidly and reached 8 percent in the mid 1990s. The period of events, in this study, 
coincides with the downturn in the economy, which in turn yields many 
observations with at least one unemployment period.  
Table 1. Number of observations in each group of experience. 
Initial years of 
experience Total  Event  Right  censored 
Percent right 
censored 
3 3,317  752  2,565  77.33 
4 4,168  934  3,234  77.59 
5 3,446  670  2,776  80.56 
6 3,017  529  2,488  82.47 
7 3,293  571  2,722  82.66 
8 2,955  450  2,505  84.77 
9 3,221  463  2,758  85.63 
10 2,445  333  2,112 86.38 
11 1,677  195  1,482 88.37 
12 2,279  252  2,027 88.94 
13 1,754  200  1,554 88.60 
≥14 19,564  1,730  17,834 91.16 
















 3-6 years of initial experience
 7-10 years of initial experience
 11- years of initial experience
Figure 2. Hazard rate estimates for different experience  












Figure 3. The unemployment rate over the studied period.  
(Source: Swedish Labour Survey, AKU, SCB)  
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4  Econometric method and modelling 
4.1  Sample issues 
The data sample used has some properties to take into account in the econometric 
analysis. A sample qualification period gives the estimation problems associated 
with stock sampling. Using a requirement of three year of subsequent employment 
to be included in the sample gives that the estimates will be conditional. In data 
there is no information if an unemployed worker has been laid off or quitted by own 
means and if the worker finds a new job before the previous job ends. The 
estimated risk of unemployment captures both the job separation risk and the risk 
of entering unemployment, conditional on a separation.  
The intensity of the transition from employment into unemployment can be 
captured in several dimensions. First, calendar time, which reflects the macro 
economic conditions; second, duration of employment (elapsed duration), to capture 
the human capital investment of tenure and/or experience.9 I n  f i g u r e  2 ,  t h e  
unemployment hazard rate is plotted for different experience length groups over 
calendar-time. This can be compared with figure 4, where the risk of getting 
unemployed is plotted over the duration of employment for three different initial 
experience lengths. If the risk is due only to seniority, one would expect that the 
lines in figure 4 would connect. The decreasing risk with experience in figure 2 and 
4 gives that a hypothesis that the risk is independent of experience is likely to  be 
rejected.  It appears that the unemployment risk may be a function of experience 
but also an outcome of economic shocks in calendar-time, both local and general. 
Major shocks may close down entire plants and thus all employees, regardless of 
tenure, have to look for a new job or face unemployment. The estimation in this 
study will therefore be over calendar time, which follows Imbens (1994) where the 
calendar time dependence is left unspecified and the duration dependence 
parameterised. By using Cox partial likelihood, the hazard rate variations of macro 
economic shocks that affect all individuals in the economy will cancel out. 
The sample qualification period, used to certify comparable sick leave measures, 
gives that the probability to be included in the sample is increasing with 
                                                 
9 A more detailed description about the different ways of modelling risk sets and their implications for the 
estimation process can be found in Tunali and Pritchett (1997).  
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employment duration. The main problem with this left truncated data set is that it 
has an overrepresentation of long durations, which is in employment duration 
(time from hiring to unemployment) gives a downward bias to the hazard rate. 
Estimating the hazard rate in calendar-time yields an ambiguous bias, downward 
due to the overrepresentation of long duration and an ambiguous effect due to 
delayed entrance time. One way to treat the bias problem, due to 
overrepresentation of long durations and the delayed entry time, is to perform the 
analysis separate for different experience lengths and at the same time restrict the 
parameters to be equal over all groups. Individuals with different length of 
experience are likely to have separate hazard functions; the exposure to risk in 
calendar-time occurs at different phases in employment duration between 
experience groups. 
The event time of unemployment is defined by a calendar date. This gives that the 
duration is measured in days and can be seen as continuous due to the large 
number of days during the period studied. 
 
Figure 4. Hazard rate estimates for different experience lengths  
plotted against the duration of employment. 
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4.2  Econometric modelling 
The econometric estimates of the duration of employment in this paper are based 
on the semiparametric proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972). The classic Cox 
model treats the covariates as constant during the time exposed to risk, whereas a 
refinement of the Cox model allows for covariates to vary during the time exposed 
to risk.  
Let  () () | ht Zt  define the hazard rate at time t  for an individual with time 
dependent risk vector  () Zt. The basic model due to Cox (1972), extended with time 
varying covariates is as follows: 
  () () ()
()
0 |
Zt ht Zt h t e
β = ⋅  (2) 
where  () 0 ht  is an arbitrary baseline hazard rate and β  is a parameter vector. This 
is called a semi parametric form because only the covariate effect is specified in a 
parametric form. The Cox model belongs to the family of proportional hazard 
models, which comes from the fact that the ratio between two individuals with 
covariate values  () Zt and  ()
* Zt  is constant when there are no time dependent 
covariates. 
The sample includes left truncated data. For left truncated and right censored 
data, only a conditional distribution of the time to event can be consistently 
estimated without parametric assumptions (Gross and Lai, 1996). If the event time 
and the truncated duration are conditionally independent, given the covariates Z , 
it is straightforward to show that the conditional hazard rate and the 
unconditional hazard rate are equal (Klein and Moeschberger, 1997). This 
assumption is unrealistic with the data used here since the risk of unemployment 
is likely to be correlated with experience as discussed in section 3.  
One way to treat this problem is to stratify over experience allowing the baseline 
hazard functions to be different and completely unrelated between strata (Klein 
and Moeschberger, 1997). To incorporate the stratification, the hazard function (2) 
is rewritten as:  
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  () () ()
()
0 | , 1,...,
Zt
ss htZ t h te s S
β = ⋅ =  (3) 
where  S  is the total number of strata. A key assumption in using the stratified 
model is that the covariate effect is equal over the baseline hazard in each stratum. 
Assume that the event times are distinct and ordered. The partial likelihood for 
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where  () si Rt is the stratum specific risk set in time  i t  (defined by the number of 
individuals, in a given stratum, exposed to risk just prior to  i t ), the event times are 
12 , ,..., D tt t and the covariate vector for an individual is defined by 
1 ( ) ( ),..., ( ) jj j p Zt Z t Z t  =  . The partial likelihood function for the entire 
maximisation problem is specified as: 
  () () () () 12 ... S LL L L ββ β β = ⋅⋅ ⋅ (5) 
The above specified likelihood function assumes that there are no ties between the 
event times. Due to the way of recording the event times, ties often occur in data. 
There exist a number of methods to handle this phenomenon, and one popular 
alternative specification of the partial likelihood function is Breslow’s likelihood10. 
Let  12 ... K tt t <<< denote the K  distinct, ordered, event times and  i d  be the 
number of events at  i t . Furthermore let  i s  be the sum of the covariate vectors 
() j Zt over all individuals who has an event at time  i t . Breslow’s ties-handling 
partial likelihood, for each stratum, is expressed as: 
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In the likelihood function above (6), each of the  i d  events are considered as distinct 
and the contribution to the likelihood in time  i t  of the tied events is calculated by 
multiplying one event’s share over all ties. This method works quite well if there 
are few ties11. The duration in this study is measured in days, which means that 
the event space is relative large and therefore results in few ties. There are also 
other ways to correct for ties, e.g. exact likelihood. When using time-dependent 
covariates, the Breslows likelihood was chosen due to that some of the other 
methods are exploding in number of permutations in the likelihood function. 
The existence of unobserved heterogeneity is hard to deny, but is not accounted for 
in the econometric model above. Most models who control for heterogeneity is 
parametric and assumes e.g. independence between the heterogeneity and the 
covariates. This assumption is likely to be violated in this study and is hard to 
relax when the covariates are time-dependent (Wooldridge, 2002). It has been 
shown that the effect of neglected unobserved heterogeneity on partial likelihood 
estimates yields a bias towards zero for the parameter estimates, whilst the 
estimated standard errors are approximately correct (Lancaster, 1990). Which one 
to choose, between a parametric model with heterogeneity control and a semi-
parametric model, is not obvious. A rule of thumb (Wooldridge, 2002): 
“Introducing unobserved heterogeneity is indistinguishable from  
simply allowing a more flexible duration distribution.” 
The described semi-parametric estimation procedure may give a bias towards zero 
for the parameter estimates, which should be compared to an ambiguous bias a 
wrongful parameterisation of the hazard function yields. 
The intensity of unemployment may, as discussed in section 2, be a function of 
macro economic, employer and individual parameters, where sick leave behaviour 
                                                 
11 See Farewell and Prentice (1980) for a discussion about bias problems associated with ties.  
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is likely to affect the unemployment risk via a signalling effect of productivity 
and/or due to loss of experience caused by absence. Building upon equation (1) and 
applying the properties of a proportional hazard model yields the following model: 
  () () 0 |, , ,
tt XYsc
tt tXYs c t e
φγ α β λλ
++ + =  (7) 
The intensity of unemployment entry,  () t λ , and its baseline counterpart,  () 0 t λ , 
will in the estimation procedure be referred as the hazard function,  () |,, , ht X Ysc, 
and the baseline hazard function,  () 0 ht . Macroeconomic effects on the hazard 
function will to a large extent be included in the baseline hazard function (see 
discussion in section 4.1). Regional dummies and local job destruction rates are 
used to catch local labour market effects () t M .  
The model to estimate is the stratified model presented above and the different 
lengths of the last continuous previously experience (measured in years) will be 
used as stratum divider. Applying the stratification and the changes described 
above to equation (7) yields: 
  () ( ) 0 | , , , | , 1,...,
tt XMs c
st t s t htX Y s c h t Ye s S
φγ α β ++ + ==  (8) 
The personal characteristic variables () t X  included in the model are sex, age, 
previous year’s income, previous year’s family income, number of children less than 
16 years of age, married/living together, immigrant Nordic/EU/Other, educational 
level, type of education, employer type and sector. The variables are mainly defined 
as dummies; the exceptions are age, previous year’s income, previous year’s family 
income and number of children less than 16 years of age. Some of the variables are 
time-dependent. For more information see the descriptive statistics in table A1 in 
appendix A. The intensities into () s  and out of () c  sick leave are proxied by the 
yearly average number of sick leaves and the average length of sick leave 
respectively. The sick leaves are divided into three spell length groups to take into 
account the different signalling effects sick spells with various length may have. To 
test if an eventual sick absence effect on the unemployment risk is driven by 
earlier workplace absence, the sick benefit payment relative to total employment 
income during 1986 to 1988 is included.  
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5  Results 
Table 2 consists of the parameter estimates for four model specifications, estimated 
with stratified Cox partial Likelihood allowing for time-varying covariates using all 
observations. These models assess if and how the observed sick leave behaviour 
pattern during 1989 to 1991 affects the risk of unemployment, controlling for an 
increasing number of individual/employer characteristics. The simplest model, # 1, 
only consists of the sick leave behaviour measures 1989 to 1991, in model 2 some 
individual characteristics are added and model 3 consists of all individual 
characteristics together with employer characteristics. The sick leave utilisation in 
1986 to 1988 is introduced in model 4 to capture persistence in the individual sick 
leave rate induced by e.g. chronic health problems. The relative risk is calculated 
using  () exp β  and the percentage effect is obtained using  () [] 100 exp 1 β − , where 
β  is the parameter estimate. 
First to be commented is model 3. An increase by one in the number of short sick 
spells (less than 8 days, with no requirement of sickness certificate) increases the 
risk of unemployment by 6.3 percent and an extra medium sick spell (8-28 days, 
with certificate requirement) raises the risk of unemployment by 17.0 percent. The 
effect of one extra long sick spell (longer than 28 days, with certificate 
requirement) is relatively high with a 30.0 percent increase of the intensity of 
unemployment. All of these results are significant at a 1 percent significance level. 
These effects together can be seen as the effect the intensity of transition into sick 
leave has on the risk of unemployment. Thus, based on the results above, there is a 
significant positive relationship between the intensity of transition into sick leave 
and the risk of unemployment.  
T h e  m e a n  d u r a t i o n  o f  s i c k  s p e l l s  i s  a l s o  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  r i s k  o f  
unemployment. An extra day in a short sick spell is penalised with a 7.1 percent 
higher risk of unemployment. The effects for medium and long sick spell durations 
are 1.1 percent and 0.08 percent respectively. This implies that there is a negative 





Table 2. Estimates of the duration models (no. individuals = 51,136, events = 7,079). 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Number short sick leave  
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Geographical dummiesa     Yes  Yes 
Education dummiesa     Yes  Yes 
Employer characteristicsa     Yes  Yes 
      
Log-Likelihood  -58,621 -58,110 -57,372 -57,370 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  Variables with (t) are time varying covariates. 
*, **, *** - significant at 10, 5, 1 percent level.  
a See appendix for a list of the variables.  
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Some of the personal characteristic variables yield interesting significant 
parameter estimates. Women have a much lower risk of unemployment compared 
to men (71.1 percent of the risk for males), given all other explanatory variables. 
This may be explained by the fact that women are underrepresented in parts of the 
business-cycle sensitive sectors such as manufacturing and construction, which are 
not captured by the sector-specific dummies in the model. One other explanation 
can be a higher proportion of women than men work part-time. The income is lower 
for a part-time worker compared to a full-time worker, given equal full-time wage. 
The gender dummy will in this case capture a difference in the income intercept 
between men and females. This goes hand in hand with the parameter estimates of 
the income variables, which show a significantly lower risk associated with higher 
incomes. The household income shows the same pattern and individuals married or 
living together have a significantly lower risk of unemployment.  
Nordic and EU immigrants do not have a significantly different risks of getting 
unemployed in comparison to natives, whereas non-EU immigrants are 
significantly more likely to become unemployed than natives.  This result goes 
hand in hand with the overrepresentation of non-EU immigrants among the ones 
who were registered as unemployed during the period of events. As one can expect, 
an increase in the local job destruction rate is associated with a significant increase 
in the risk of unemployment.  
There is a possibility that the pattern of sick leave behaviour during 1989 to 1991 
is a continuation of previous sick leave behaviour, which in turn can be induced by 
chronic health problems. The sickness benefits fraction of total individual 
employment income during 1986 to 1988 is included in the model to capture the 
previous absence behaviour. The results of the model extended with the absence 
measure is presented in table II, model 4 (for all covariates see table A1 in 
appendix). 
The significant positive effects of the sick leave behaviour pattern 1989-1991 on the 
risk of unemployment persist in model 4, compared with model 3. The effect on 




Table 3. Estimates for different subgroups. 
  Men Women  Age  25-40  Age 41-54 
Number short sick leave  









Number medium sick leave  









Number long sick leave  
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Geographical dummies a Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Education dummies a Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Employer characteristics a Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
No.  observations  34,126 17,010 22,035 29,101 
Events  5,308 1,769 3,858 3,219 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  Variables with (t) are time varying covariates. 
*, **, *** - significant at 10, 5, 1 percent level.  
a See appendix for a list of the variables.  
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not significantly altered when the previous absence proxies are included in the 
model. No significant effect of the model extension in model 4 can be seen for the 
other personal characteristic variables. 
Four model specifications are presented in table 2, where the fully specified model 
is the last among the four. The first two models together with the two previous 
commented models are estimated to perform parameter stability checks, where the 
first only consists of the covariates of main interest and additional covariates are 
introduced in the second and third model towards the fully specified model. It is 
striking that all the sick leave behaviour parameters remain significant at a 1 
percent rejection level with preserved signs. The estimated parameters are stable 
throughout the introduction of new covariates describing individual, employer and 
geographical characteristics. 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of dividing the material, first into two 
subgroups representing the two genders and second into two age groups (25-40 and 
40-54 years of age at start of the study January 1st 1992). A comparison between 
the two genders shows mainly equal effects of the sick leave behaviour on the risk 
of unemployment, except for two parameter estimates. On interesting result is that 
the intensity of becoming unemployed due to one extra long sick spell is increased 
almost twice as much for women as for men. The percentage effect on the hazard 
rate of one extra day of absence in a medium sick leave spell is not significant at a 
5 percent rejection level for women, while the effect for men is positively significant 
at the 1 percent level. According to this result, the relative punishment for long 
periods of sick absence in terms of higher risk of getting unemployed is more than 
twice as big for women as for men, whereas a penalty of an extra day in a medium 
sick leave spell is significant for men but not for women.  
The parameter estimates for men show that increased age is significantly 
associated with an enhanced risk of unemployment even though the increase is 
lowered with age. Experience is controlled for in the estimation procedure and the 
result suggests that an older worker is more likely to register as unemployed. One 
interpretation might be that an older worker may have an extensive previous 
unemployment record in comparison to a young worker, holding experience 
constant. As discussed in section 4.1, the risk of unemployment is a combination of  
 
24
the risk of getting laid off and the risk of getting hired before the previous 
employment period ends. It is also likely that a younger individual finds it easier to 
get hired than an older worker. These two explanations together with a likely 
depreciation of human capital during unemployment or an out of labour force 
period support the result (Edin and Gustavsson, 2002).  
Estimation of the duration model for young and older workers separately yields no 
significant parameter difference between the two age groups (column 3 and 4 in 
table 3). Nevertheless a pattern of higher penalty for young relatively older 
workers can be seen due to that almost all sick leave behaviour parameters are 
relatively higher in the young age group.  
Comparing the sick leave behaviour parameter estimates of all the subgroups in 
table 3 with the parameters in the fully specified model (table 2) strengthens the 
above discussed parameter stability check. All the results presented above show a 
clear increased risk of getting unemployed of increased use of sick leave. 
As discussed in the data section, it is likely that the impact of the pattern of sick 
leave utilisation 1989 to 1991 weakens as time passes. To be able to capture a 
change in the effect of the 1989 to 1991 sick leave behaviour parameters over time, 
they are divided into two to cover the 1992 to 1995 period and the 1996 to 1998 
periods separately. This is made by multiplying the sick leave parameters with 
time dependent dummy variables. The 1992 to 1995 variables take the sick leave 
Table 4. Estimates for different time periods. 
  1992 - 1995  1996 – 1998 
Number short sick leave  





Number medium sick leave  





Number long sick leave  





Mean extra days in  





Mean extra days in  





Mean extra days in  





Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** - significant at 10, 5, 1 percent level.  The estimated model 
is, except for the sick leave behaviour variables above, the same as the model 4 in table 2.  
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incidence and duration values during 1992 to 1995 and zero during 1996 to 1998; 
for the period 1996 to 1998, vice verse. Parts of the estimation result can be found 
in table 4. The parameter estimates for the first period, 1992 to 1995, do not 
deviate from corresponding results for the entire period (model 4, table 2), whereas 
the estimates from the later time period show an overall lowered and mainly 
insignificant effect on the risk of getting unemployed. According to this, the effect 
of the sick leave behaviour on the risk of unemployment is not persistent over time. 
This might be explained by a weakened effect over time and together with a 
decreased individual sick leave utilisation during the period of high unemployment 
a short persistence of the effect is likely.  
 
6  Concluding remarks 
The focus of this study has been to test if sick absence increases the risk of 
subsequent unemployment. Sick leave data from the end of a period of low 
unemployment is used to measure the pattern of sick leave behaviour. The 
individuals are followed throughout a period of economic recession where the event 
of interest is if the workers get unemployed. The empirical analysis presents 
evidence of an association between sick absence and the risk of unemployment. An 
increase in both the number of various sick spell lengths and the number of days in 
the sick spells yields a highly significant increase in the unemployment risk.  
An individual’s extended use of sick leaves may come from e.g. chronic health 
problems or from a workplace dissatisfaction that results in usage of the sickness 
benefit system. Whether or not the individual uses an extended amount of sick 
leaves, these personal characteristics might be visual for an employer and the 
individual is classified as unproductive. It is likely that a worker who is regarded 
as unproductive has an increased risk of getting laid-off. If this explanation holds, 
the result will be affected by an unobserved productivity and the observed sick 
leave will work as a proxy for this unobservable.  
To control for earlier use of sick leaves, the 1986 to 1988 sickness benefit fraction of 
total income is included in the analysis. The hypothesis is that if the sick leave 
behaviour is due to observable personal characteristics then the earlier absence  
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measure will coincide with the observed sick leave behaviour in 1989 to 1991. The 
results from the empirical analysis show no significant evidence of this, which in 
turn may suggest that a penalty associated with sick leaves is a perishable. The 
weakened effect over time is also evident by estimating the sick leave behaviour 
effect for the first 4 years and the last 3 years separately in the 1992 to 1998 event 
period. 
Several recent papers (e.g. Arai and Skogman-Thoursie, 2001, Askildsen et al., 
2000, Askildsen et al., 2002 and Henrekson and Persson, 2001) have shown that 
the unemployment rate varies inversely with the sick absence rate and one 
explanation to this is that a rising unemployment rate has a disciplinary effect on 
the sick leave rate. The pattern of sick leave behaviour was measured during the 
end of a period of low unemployment in Sweden (1989-1991), which may give that 
the absence prone workers were confident and revealed their true sick leave 
behaviour. The outcome space is during a period of economic recession and even if 
workers adjust their sick absence behaviour, due to the increased unemployment 
rate, it is likely that employers remember the sick leave behavioural pattern some 
years ago. If the employer, during a downturn in the economy, fires workers who 
showed on extended sick leave behaviour during a time of low unemployment, a 
disciplining effect on the individual absence rate of high unemployment is likely. 
Due to the findings that absence prone workers have a higher risk of 
unemployment during a downturn in the economy, the aggregated absence rate is 
likely to show a pro-cyclical pattern whether or not a disciplining effect exists.  
One limitation of the study is that we cannot observe if a worker is being laid off or 
quits and if the worker finds a new job before the previous job ends. The estimated 
risk measures include both an estimate of the job separation risk and of the risk of 
not being hired before the previous job ends. 
The empirical analysis yielded some other interesting results beside the pattern of 
sick leave behaviour. For example, women have a much lower risk of getting 
unemployed. This result is not unlikely if one compares the proportion women 
among the ones who experience at least one unemployment spell with those who 
remained employed until censored. Some of the difference in risk between women 
and men may be explained by the interaction with the other explanatory variables  
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used. Parts of the gender difference may be explained by the income effect on the 
risk of unemployment, as women have lower income than men due to e.g. part-time 
work. Non-EU and non-Nordic immigrants have a significantly higher risk of 
getting unemployed than natives, which follows the result of Arai and Vilhelmsson 
(2001). The result of this study can not show if the risk differential is due to 
productivity differentials or discrimination, but Arai and Vilhelmsson (2001) claim 
that Non-EU and non-Nordic immigrants are discriminated against.  
The result also suggests that women have a higher unemployment risk penalty 
associated with long sick leave spells. One result, for men, is that the risk of 
unemployment is increasing in age, given all other explanatory variables. This 
result is surprising at first sight. However, given equal work experience, an older 
worker may have more unemployment experience. It is also likely that it is easier 
for a younger individual to get hired, as the risk of unemployment both includes 
the risk of getting laid-off and the risk of not being hired before the last 
employment ends. 
In sum, this study has shown that higher sick absenteeism is associated with a 
higher risk of becoming unemployed. More analysis is still needed to study if this 
relationship is driven by the risk of getting laid off or if it is an outcome of the risk 
of not getting rehired before the last employment ends.  
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Appendix, Table A1. Estimation results and descriptive statistics of the data. 




risk All  obs. 
Obs. with an 
unempl. period 
Obs. empl. all  
years of study 
Number short sick leave  
spells (1-7 days) 
0.05926***
(0.00608) 
1.061 1.928  2.353  1.860 
Number medium sick leave  
spells (8-28 days) 
0.15030***
(0.03016) 
1.162 0.217  0.312  0.201 
Number long sick leave  
spells (>28 days) 
0.25353***
(0.04741) 
1.289 0.080  0.111  0.075 
Mean extra days in  
short sick leave spell 
0.06786***
(0.00857) 
1.070 1.677  2.033  1.620 
Mean extra days in  
medium sick leave spell 
0.01064***
(0.00324) 
1.011 1.996  2.694  1.884 
Mean extra days in  
long sick leave spell 
0.00067***
(0.00012) 
1.001 10.674  17.077  9.646 
Fraction sick benefits of  
total income, 86-88 
0.29783 
(0.18973) 
1.347 0.030  0.040  0.028 
Woman  -0.34061***
(0.03474) 
0.711 0.333  0.250  0.346 
Age  0.02230 
(0.01650) 
1.023 40.346  38.170  40.695 
Age2  -0.00031 
(0.00021) 
1.000 -  -  - 
Income (t) 
(prev. year, 100 000 SEK) 
-0.07883***
(0.02756) 
0.924 2.151  1.968  2.181 
Income2 (t)  
(prev. year, 100 000 SEK) 
0.00033** 
(0.00014) 
1.000 -  -  - 
Household income (t)  
(prev. year, 100 000 SEK) 
-0.08565***
(0.01721) 
0.918 3.206  2.741  3.280 
Household income2 (t)  
(prev. year, 100 000 SEK) 
0.00013***
(0.00004) 
1.000 -  -  - 
Number of kids (t)  0.00728 
(0.01574) 
1.007 0.672  0.618  0.680 
Married/living together (t)  -0.15927***
(0.03753) 
0.853 0.586  0.477  0.603 
Immigrant: Nordic  0.07180 
(0.05870) 
1.074 0.172  0.172  0.172 
Immigrant: Other EU  -0.16628 
(0.23672) 
0.847 0.040  0.045  0.039 
Immigrant: Non-EU  0.12379** 
(0.05886) 
1.132 0.003  0.003  0.003 
Local job destruction rate (t)  1.24697***
(0.38307) 
3.480 0.038  0.047  0.037 
Educational level:          
Pre high-school education 
shorter than 9 years. 
0.30199***
(0.06975) 
1.353 0.108  0.129  0.105 




1.279 0.114  0.152  0.108 
High-school, 2 years.  0.14320***
(0.04043) 
1.154 0.318  0.416  0.302 
High-school, 3-4 years. 
 
Reference   0.136  0.126  0.137 
Undergraduate education, 
shorter than 3 years. 
-0.20407***
(0.05466) 
0.815 0.146  0.100  0.154 
Undergraduate education,  
at least 3 years. 
-0.46037***
(0.06313) 
0.631 0.167  0.070  0.182 
Post-graduate education.  -0.86166***
(0.28162) 
0.422 0.009  0.002  0.010 
Unspecified level of education.  0.16288 
(0.22445) 









risk All  obs. 
Obs. with an 
unempl. period 
Obs. empl. all  
years of study 
Type of education:           
Common education,  
non-vocational. 
Reference   0.269  0.331  0.259 




1.317 0.015  0.013  0.016 
Pedagogic. -0.07222 
(0.09676) 





1.027 0.182  0.148  0.188 









0.900 0.023  0.024  0.023 
Health care.  -0.38806***
(0.08533) 
0.678 0.090  0.043  0.098 
Farming, forestry and fishing.  0.00931 
(0.11058) 
1.009 0.014  0.016  0.014 
Service, security and military.  -0.19610** 
(0.09564) 
0.822 0.038  0.024  0.040 
Other 0.18695 
(0.13380) 
1.206 0.010  0.014  0.010 
Type of employer (t):          
Individual. 0.67362***
(0.13348) 
1.961 0.003  0.008  0.002 
Privately owned company.  -0.62198** 
(0.29047) 
0.537 0.003  0.001  0.003 
Trading company.  0.50760***
(0.12275) 
1.661 0.005  0.009  0.004 
Joint-stock company. 
 










1.773 0.016  0.023  0.015 
Foundation. 0.21682 
(0.13700) 
1.242 0.007  0.007  0.007 
Public/Government. -0.32337***
(0.04320) 
0.724 0.363  0.201  0.389 
Other. 0.51065***
(0.08394) 
1.666 0.013  0.017  0.012 
Branch employed in (t):          
Farming, forestry and fishing  -0.11933 
(0.09751) 
0.888 0.009  0.013  0.008 
Mining -0.22521***
(0.05668) 
0.798 0.004  0.006  0.004 
Manufacturing 
 
Reference   0.238  0.233  0.239 
Energy 0.79521***
(0.05232) 
2.215 0.009  0.003  0.010 
Construction 0.51739***
(0.04585) 
1.678 0.069  0.184  0.050 




1.179 0.105  0.136  0.101 




1.470 0.091  0.085  0.092 




1.050 0.119  0.113  0.120 
Public and private service.  0.15331** 
(0.06083) 









risk All  obs. 
Obs. with an 
unempl. period 
Obs. empl. all  
years of study 
Regional dummies (t):           
County 1 
 
Reference   0.230  0.204  0.234 
County 3  0.29807***
(0.06752) 
1.347 0.034  0.039  0.034 
County 4  0.13313* 
(0.07376) 
1.142 0.030  0.030  0.030 
County 5  0.13717** 
(0.06282) 
1.147 0.047  0.047  0.048 
County 6  0.16463** 
(0.07281) 
1.179 0.033  0.033  0.033 
County 7  0.05592 
(0.09171) 
1.058 0.020  0.019  0.020 
County 8  0.32988***
(0.07686) 
1.391 0.023  0.028  0.023 
County 9  0.03154 
(0.17780) 
1.032 0.005  0.005  0.005 
County 10  0.15985* 
(0.09561) 
1.173 0.017  0.017  0.017 
County 12  0.17418***
(0.04521) 
1.190 0.116  0.119  0.116 
County 13  0.12812* 
(0.07757) 
1.137 0.029  0.028  0.029 
County 14  0.08647** 
(0.04187) 
1.090 0.164  0.156  0.165 
County 17  0.20944***
(0.07276) 
1.233 0.030  0.032  0.029 
County 18  0.28501***
(0.07141) 
1.330 0.031  0.034  0.031 
County 19  0.25834***
(0.07379) 
1.295 0.029  0.031  0.029 
County 20  0.29426***
(0.07042) 
1.342 0.029  0.034  0.028 
County 21  0.27587***
(0.06843) 
1.318 0.032  0.037  0.031 
County 22  0.16169** 
(0.07736) 
1.176 0.029  0.028  0.029 
County 23  0.27873***
(0.10234) 
1.321 0.013  0.015  0.013 
County 24  0.24002***
(0.07506) 
1.271 0.028  0.031  0.028 
County 25  0.32647***
(0.07042) 
1.386 0.030  0.035  0.029 
          
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
*,**,*** - significant at 10, 5, 1 percent level. 
(t) – Time varying covariates, the value from 1992 is presented in the descriptive statistics. 
 
 